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Title: The Invisible Issue of Organ Laundering 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, global institutions including the United Nations (UN), the Council of 
Europe [1], the World Health Organization (WHO) [2] and the European Union (EU) 
[3] have declared measures to deter organ trafficking, whilst reiterating the lack of 
official statistics about this illegal trade. A professional response through 
international societies culminated in the Declaration of Istanbul on Organ Trafficking 
and Transplant Tourism [4], establishing a set of principles to guide professional 
conduct and government policy. The crucial link between human trafficking and 
WUDI¿FNLQJRIKXPDQRUJDQVZDVUHFRJQLVHGE\WKH81PRUHWKDQDGHFDGHDJR [5] 
and, more recently, a joint study with the Council of Europe [1] identified the need to 
differentiate trafficking in human beings for the purpose of the removal of organs 
from the trafficking in human organs per se.1  
 
 
All these initiatives reiterate two key issues that hinder global action against these 
crimes: the absence of DQLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\DJUHHGGHILQLWLRQRI³WUDIILFNLQJLQRUJDQV
WLVVXHVDQGFHOOV´DQGthe lack of reliable official data about the illegal organ trade 
[1]. The lack of global definitions is exploited by traffickers and middlemen who take 
advantage of the differences between legal systems in their transnational crime. The 
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 While acknowledging the scientific debate on differences, confusion and overlap between organ trafficking and 
trafficking in human beings for the purpose of organ removal [9], in this paper we refer to both crimes jointly 
focusing on their similarities. 
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problem of gathering reliable data versus apocryphal stories is a key factor in these 
investigations [6]. In this article, however, we focus on the reasons why organ 
trafficking remains unreported. We argue that once organs are trafficked there are 
certain factors that allow for "laundering" in WKHSXUFKDVHU¶VFRXQWU\ thus giving the 
veneer of legitimacy while hindering accurate estimation of the problem. In effect, 
illicitly purchased organs are transformed into legitimate organs by the process of 
integration into mainstream financial institutions (reimbursement by insurers) and 
health services (follow-up treatment). 
 
The µDark Figure¶ of Organ Trafficking Crime 
 
Criminologists DUHIDPLOLDUZLWK³LQYLVLEOH´FULPHDQGWKHLQDGHTXDF\RIRIILFLDO
records to reflect the true extent of criminality. This phenomenon - known as the 
³GDUNILJXUHRIFULPH´[7] RU³WKHLFHEHUJRIFULPHWKHRU\´[8] - describes how only a 
small proportion of crime is visible. One of the reasons crime remains unreported is 
the reluctance to accept victim status for fear of embarrassment, stigmatisation or 
the possibility of implicating themselves in criminal acts. Crimes also go unnoticed 
due to the absence of reliable witnesses, because illicit goods are difficult to trace or 
because of the high status of the offenders (white-collar crime). Well known reasons 
for underreporting this crime [6] perpetuate invisibility but other aspects typical of 
organised criminal activity [9] and crimes of the powerful are also crucial. The 
following five areas of discussion explore how a ³OHJLWLPDWHEXVLQHVV± such as organ 
transplantation ± can WXUQLQWRDQLOOHJLWLPDWHRQH´ [6] and then be disguised as 
legitimate again. 
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A. Globalization, Jurisdiction and Law Enforcement 
Organ trafficking can be ± but it is not exclusively ± a transnational crime. The 
characteristics of organised transnational crime jeopardise possibilities of detection, 
prevention and prosecution. As indicated, organ trafficking offences are complex [10] 
and span several jurisdictions with sellers originating in different continents to the 
UHFLSLHQWV$VZLWKµOD\HULQJ¶LQPRQH\laundering [11], organ brokers and traffickers 
often locate their operation bases in unrelated countries, further complicating 
traceability.  
The de-regulation of the global market place and the online accessibility of medical 
tourism companies [12] enhance opportunities for cross-border crime [13]. A parallel 
can be drawn with the international narcotics trade. Confronted with cross-border 
crimes, nation states may struggle to prosecute their citizens for crimes committed 
abroad. Effective responses to the extra-jurisdictional challenges in illicit organ trade 
require a transnational criminal law approach [14]. 
Discretion forms a key aspect of police and law-enforcement activity [15]. Strategic 
decisions over which activities to prioritize are often based on chances of securing 
successful convictions. Prohibition may not, then, always be accompanied by 
rigorous enforcement when the police face both the challenges of international 
investigations and proving that a transplanted organ was illegally bought.  
B. Power and Status in Healthcare Professions 
Crimes committed by high status individuals are frequently unrepresented in official 
figures [8] and often treated with relative impunity. Successful organ trafficking 
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requires the involvement of medical professionals and sophisticated cooperation 
between licensed professionals and licensed facilities [16]. A range of logistical 
coordination and technical expertise is also necessary including, but not limited to, 
medical directors of transplant units, hospital and medical staff, technicians in blood 
and tissue laboratories, dual surgical teams, nephrologists and postoperative nurses 
[17]. 
 
Surgeons are key players but most international legislations - with the exception of 
Switzerland, which sets a higher penalty for health professionals - do not explicitly 
distinguish between medical staff and other actors. Only in Czech Republic, Iceland, 
Ireland, Panama and China is a medical practice ban imposed for health 
professionals involved in trafficking [18]. 
The impunity of surgeons performing illegal extractions and transplants of organs 
may be exacerbated by their high status in many countries and aggravated by issues 
of self-regulation and detection of crime being contingent on medical professionals 
reporting their colleagues. In 2010, an organ trafficking network uncovered in South 
Africa included four surgeons and one nephrologist [19]. South AfULFD¶VELJJHVW
private hospital group admitted 102 counts relating to illegal operations. In this 
network, Brazilians sold their kidneys to Israeli patients with transplantation taking 
place in South Africa. While the kidney sellers were imprisoned in their home 
countries, the nephrologist was fined $15,000 and the four transplant surgeons, 
originally charged with assisting in 90 illegal transplant operations, had all charges 
against them withdrawn [20]. While sanctions against health care staff, including 
licence revocation, have been applied, it is unclear whether these are effective 
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deterrents [9]. Complex and multifactorial solutions have therefore been proposed 
elsewhere [17] [21]. 
C. Reimbursement of Transplantation Costs Abroad by Insurers 
It has been reported that some countries reimburse the cost of transplantation of 
trafficked organs to medically insured mobile transplant patients. Public and private 
insurance companies promote and enable transplants to occur abroad without 
regard to the source of the organ [21]. The case of Israeli insurance companies 
reimbursing transplant organs sourced abroad regardless of origin has been well 
described and the banning of this practice came into effect in 2008 [22] [23]2. In the 
US, some medical insurance programs encourage policyholders to travel to foreign 
countries for organ transplantation. Savings for agreeing to ³PHGLFDOYDOXH´ 
procedures abroad are then passed to the employee as a bonus for lowering 
corporate health care expenses [24]. The promotion of transplantation abroad as a 
money-saving proposition has the potential to ignore the extraterritorial 
criminalization of the activity.  
In 2010, the Netherlands amended legislation that ensured reimbursement for 
transplants abroad regardless of whether the organ had been purchased, despite 
conflicting with ethical and legal norms. The present agreement allows only for intra- 
EU member reimbursement [25] but may fail to acknowledge the social, health and 
economic inequalities between new EU member states [26]. 
 
D. Sellers: Donor Vulnerability and Ambivalence of the Victim Status  
                                                          
2
 The prohibition of reimbursement for transplantation abroad that contravenes local and Israeli law- and other 
measures implemented at the same time- seem to have reduced transplantation abroad in Israelis. [23] 
6 
 
In organ trafficking, there are blurred divisions between perpetrators and victims. In 
legal terms, issues of coercion, informed consent and exploitation are complicated. 
Victims may consent to the removal of their organs but this may be under duress or 
without being fully aware of risks and long-term health impacts. The duress may be 
external (by force, as in the well documented case of prisoners in China [21]), but it 
may also be internal (driven by financial need) since vulnerable populations are the 
sources of trafficked organs. There may be deception as to the amount of payment 
for the organ [27] [28] or no payment at all. The exploitation of vendors in the 
process of the offence is reinforced by the lasting psychological, financial, social and 
health consequences [29] - [33].  
 
Victims are unlikely to take action against traffickers since they may perceive 
themselves as being complicit in the offence or for fear reprisal from concomitant 
offences such as providing false information or illegal border crossing. The stigma 
and discrimination associated with selling organs may also hinder crime reporting 
[1][34].  
  
Vendors are in fact more likely to be prosecuted. Some criminals are more tolerated 
than others and it seems that across the globe, the majority of convicted offenders 
are younger men from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. Research has noted that 
this could be an artefact of social inequalities in the detection, prosecution and 
sentencing of criminal behaviour [35]. Crimes FRPPLWWHGE\µKLJK-VWDWXV¶powerful 
offenders [36] are more tolerated, while crimes of the powerless stand more chance 
of prosecution. Organ trafficking is therefore no different from crimes such as drug 
trafficking where the criminalisation of the vulnerable (i.e. drug mules) is evident [37]. 
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It is illegal to sell an organ to a non-related person for profit in many countries and 
kidney vendors have been sentenced in countries like Romania [38], Brazil [19], 
Jordan [39] and Singapore [40].  
 
 
E. Buyers: Recipient Vulnerability and Ambivalence of the Offender Status 
Buyers of illicit organs are likely to have made false statements, claiming to be blood 
related to the seller or holding false documentation. Although organ buyers have 
EHHQUHIHUUHGWRDV³HWKLFDOO\REWXVH´GLVSOD\LQJGLVUHJDUGIRURWKHUKXPDQEHLQJV 
[33], others consider the desperate situation of the seriously or mortally ill as 
justifying the ends to which they resort. In effect, the criminal liability of buyers is 
contested. Caplan et al. [1] noted that several EU states objected to criminalising 
buyers and that no agreement among states could be reached about this provision. 
Some countries (Finland, Morocco, the Netherlands, New Zealand [18], Japan [41], 
Spain [42]) criminalise buyers but convictions are rare. 
 
A high percentage of buyers of organs abroad are not included on waiting lists in 
their countries since there may be supply/demand problems; strict listing criteria for 
transplantation may apply; and some buyers may be deemed medically unfit to 
receive a transplant. Studies in Europe [43] [44] and North America [45] [46] have 
identified a tendency of ethnic minorities to buy from their countries of origin, a 
phenomenon promoted by their reduced chances to be allocated organs in their 
resident countries.  
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In general, organ recipients are treated as witnesses in criminal prosecutions but 
they have also been convicted in South Africa [19], Japan [41] and Singapore [39]. 
Organ vendors and organ recipients share the fear of prosecution as a strong 
motivation for maintaining the secrecy of their involvement. 
 
The Issue of Organ Laundering 
Through the processes outlined above organs obtained illicitly can take on the 
veneer of a licit transaction. Organ transplantation in a foreign country is legal while 
the purchase of the organ is illicit. Illegal transplants tend to be concealed or 
disguised as altruistic donations. How determined the professional staff are to 
understand the true nature of the donor/recipient relationship is a key issue. This is 
the case in the countries where transplants take place but also for clinical teams in 
the home countries. Before or after travelling, potential buyers may report their 
intention to have organ transplantation abroad; they may need to take with them 
medical records but they also need to ensure their long-term medication needs will 
be provided by their medical centres and covered by their insurance companies.  
Clinicians are expected to deter crime by discouraging their patients from travelling 
abroad and, in countries like Spain [42], reporting the recipient to authorities is 
compulsory if follow-up care is requested3. The traditional clinician role transfers 
from medical carer to controlling agent, encouraged to deter, prevent and police 
transplant tourism [45] [46]. Figure 1 illustrates how in this complex transnational 
crime, home countries unknowingly play an important role in laundering trafficked 
                                                          
3
 The Spanish Penal Code requires citizens to report crimes of which they are aware. Consequently, since 
consenting of transplantation knowing the illicit origin of an organ is a crime, it is inferred that doctors must 
report recipients. 
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organs into mainstream services by facilitating and paying for follow-up treatments. 
Ethical issues must not be underestimated; recipients should always be treated but 
professional guidelines that safeguard donors, recipients and healthcare teams 
should be implemented. 
With a limited amount of information available from official sources, statistical 
invisibility is a well-defined characteristic of organ trafficking. The factors described 
above promote and perpetuate invisibility and are likely to obstruct the effectiveness 
of legislation and policing of this crime. Acknowledging the contested legalities and 
illegalities in the traffic of human organs [47], it is reasonable to say that the time has 
now come for a serious discussion about the current failures evident in local 
legislations that unintentionally promote this trade. This is necessary so that 
innovative, effective measures can be put in place to deter this phenomenon. 
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